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IĐeland’s FinanĐial IĐeďerg: Why Leǀeraging up is a TitaniĐ Mistake ǁithout a Reserǀe CurrenĐy 
 
 
IĐelaŶd͛s ďooŵ and bust replicate in miniature the causes, development and trajectory of the absolutely 
larger but proportionately smaller American boom and bust, eǆĐept foƌ IĐelaŶd͛s ĐostlǇ laĐk of a ƌeseƌǀe 
currency aŶd its ďaŶks͛ pƌefeƌeŶĐe Ŷot just foƌ speĐulatiŶg in but overpaying for shaky assets. A 
combination of excessive leverage and extensive maturity mismatches marked every level of the global 
economy in the 2000s. Leverage uses large volumes of debt to magnify the returns on a narrow equity 
base. Mismatched maturity occurs when short term borrowing is used to fund long term investment. 
Households leveraged their consumption by borrowing against their home equity, and by buying 
expensive houses with little or no down payment. Financial firms borrowed from short term money 
markets to purchase long-dated assets, including and especially mortgage backed securities (MBS) and 
derivatives built on those MBS. In the aggregate, both the US and Icelandic economies sold short term, 
passive, and liquid assets to the world, consumed part of that borrowing, and reinvested outward in 
fixed, long term and active investments. The key differences between Icelandic and US banks are that 
IĐelaŶd͛s ďaŶks ŵade theiƌ titaŶiĐ gaŵďles ǁithout the ďeŶefit of a life-raft. US banks had a life-raft – 
the US dollar is the international reserve currency. This enabled the United States to survive its 
catastrophe and continue to have access to global credit markets without much penalty. By contrast, 
Iceland has mortgaged its economy and economic independence for decades to obtain a bail out for 
banks that had overpaid for assets and most likely stripped value from those assets as well. 
 
In this article I first describe the mismatch plus leverage phenomena in the United States to show the 
larger global environment enveloping Iceland. The second section elaborates the political economy of 
Iceland to establish a baseline for the third section. The third section shows how Iceland replicated in an 
exaggerated fashion the US pattern of leverage and mismatch, and boom and bust. Keynes tells us that 
eĐoŶoŵiĐs is Ŷot a ŵoƌalitǇ tale. But IĐelaŶd͛s fiŶaŶĐial Vikings did sail blithely into icy waters without 
the benefit of an international reserve currency, as the conclusion notes. Surely a catastrophic mistake, 
and one with fatal economic consequences for their banks and their fellow Icelandic passengers. 
 
1: Leverage and maturity mismatch in the global economy 
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During the long 1990s – 1991 to 2006 – the United States operated a system of global arbitrage in which 
it borrowed cash from the rest of the world on a short term, low interest rate basis, and then turned 
around and invested much of that money back into the world on a long term, high return basis. This 
leveraged growth gave the United States economic growth rates well above the OECD average, which 
increased the implicit leverage in the US economy by attracting more capital inflows. The mismatch in 
maturities (short term inflows versus long term outflows) gave United States positive net international 
investment income despite being a massive net international debtor. This net income largely accrued to 
American multinational firms, including its banks. 
 
 The US housing finance system sat at the heart of the leverage/mismatch machine. At the macro-
economic level, the United States systematically borrowed short term at low interest rates from the rest 
of the world, and then turned around and invested back in the rest of the world in longer term, higher 
risk, higher return, active investment vehicles. Foreigners provided between 10 and 20% of total lending 
in US credit markets annually after 1994 and 25 peƌĐeŶt afteƌ ϮϬϬϱ ;D͛Aƌista aŶd Gƌiffith-Jones, 
2006:64). At the micro-economic level US financial institutions transformed cheap short-term foreign 
borrowing into a huge variety of higher yield, longer term MBS and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs). Physically, US arbitrage transformed cheap overseas credit into outsized domestic investment 
and in particular into (literally) outsized housing. The sale of MBS and Treasury bonds linked the micro 
and macro-economic levels by creating more purchasing power for home-owning consumers. The 
dollaƌ͛s international role and the implicit US government guarantee for mortgage giants Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac enabled the United States to borrow in global markets at low interest rates (Schwartz, 
2009).  
 
AŵeƌiĐa͛s leveraged economy yielded huge returns to a handful of firms, just as IĐelaŶd͛s appeaƌed to. 
From 1960 to 2001, US overseas assets earned an annualized rate of return 2 percentage points higher 
than US liabilities yielded to foreigners, at 5.6 percent versus 3.6 percent (Gourinchas and Rey, 2005). 
Furthermore, the gap expanded after 1973, with US assets yielding 6.8 percent, while liabilities cost only 
3.5 percent. Profits by US-based multinational firms account for most of this disparity. But unlike 
Iceland, the US largely borrowed from the rest of the world in dollars. This vastly reduced the risk that a 
currency collapse would cause banks to fail; symmetrically it meant that the US central bank could 
rescue banks, should they fail, merely by printing dollars. 
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American leverage also powered more general economic growth, enabling the United States to out-
grow its rich country peers and enjoy its own version of the Icelandic Land Rover boom. US GDP per 
capita increased 33.5 percent from 1991 to 2005, versus an OECD average of only 28.1 percent. While 
the crisis shows that some of this US growth is fictitious, the same is true for the laggards (Germany at 
17.3 percent and Japan at 13.3 percent), whose growth largely depended on exports to a turbocharged 
US economy. Home mortgages were central to both borrowing and growth. Households borrowed 
against home equity – the value of their houses net of mortgage debt – and then spent that equity.  
 
Foreign capital inflows collateralized by housing thus created a temporarily self sustaining cycle. In-flows 
provided money to the US mortgage market and pushed down nominal interest rates; these enabled 
housing prices to rise; homeowners cashed out and spent part of the increase in house prices; this 
increased aggregate demand made the economy grow even faster, drawing in yet more foreign capital; 
foreign capital found new assets to buy because higher house prices enabled banks to underwrite more 
MBS. The United States built 27.7 million units of housing 1990-2006, which helped the US create half of 
the OECD͛s Ŷeǁ joďs ϭϵϵϭ-2005. So long as housing prices and incomes continued to rise, this cycle 
could continue. The international reserve currency position of the US dollar sat at the heart of this cycle, 
and by permitting US based entities to borrow and lend in dollars immunized them against some 
crippling risks (Schwartz, 2009).  
 
The dollaƌ͛s international position mitigated the dual risks of leveraging and maturity mismatch. 
Leveraging is inherently risky: borrowing creates fixed obligations that might be hard to service if the 
income generated by the asset side of the balance sheet falls. Yet a fall in the dollar would create 
offsetting income, because US exports would probably increase and US receipts of foreign income would 
increase in dollar terms. Maturity mismatches – using short term borrowing to fund long term 
investments – are also inherently risky. Creditors might call in their short term loans, forcing an 
eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ liƋuidatioŶ of a ďoƌƌoǁeƌ͛s loŶg teƌŵ positioŶs. Yet ďeĐause US foƌeigŶ deďt ǁas dollaƌ-
denominated, the United States government could always print more dollars to meet any emergency 
need in the financial system (as indeed happened 2007-2009).  Foreign lenders would have hesitated to 
lend so much to the United States had the dollar not been a reserve currency. And had the dollar not 
been a reserve currency, the risks to US households, firms and state of borrowing overseas for current 
consumption in addition to overseas investment would have been unbearable, as they have proved to 
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be for Icelandic households. Instead, the dollar mitigated those risks, because US based entities 
borrowing in dollars, avoided adding a currency mismatch to their maturity mismatch.  
 
None of this was true for Icelandic banks, even though they also engaged in a leveraged maturity 
mismatch after deregulation defrosted Icelandic housing assets and enabled Icelandic households and 
firms to use them as collateral against foreign borrowing. Theoretically Icelandic banks could have 
hedged their foreign exchange exposures, but doing so would have been costly. Moreover, they would 
have been hedging liabilities composed of thousands of inherently unpredictable and volatile retail 
deposits in schemes like LaŶdsďaŶki͛s IĐesaǀe or KaupthiŶg͛s Edge aĐĐouŶts. Finally, hedging would have 
pƌoǀided iŶfoƌŵatioŶ to the fiŶaŶĐial ŵaƌkets aďout the tƌue eǆteŶt of the IĐelaŶdiĐ ďaŶks͛ liabilities, 
reducing their creditworthiness. 
 
Ϯ: IĐelaŶd͛s political economy 
IĐelaŶd͛s VikiŶg ďaŶks opeƌated iŶ a ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt eĐoŶoŵiĐ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt from US financial firms, and 
not only because Iceland lacked a reserve currency. Iceland has a small population base, a narrow 
economic base aŶd a ƌelatiǀelǇ ĐoŶtƌolled eĐoŶoŵǇ. IĐelaŶd͛s population – about 300,000 – is roughly 
the size of New Orleans, Cardiff or Bonn. Public sector employment and state ownership were fairly 
limited compared to other Scandinavian economies. Unlike Sweden, only one-fourth of the labour 
market is in the public sector. Unlike Norway, state ownership is salient only in power generation (and 
thus linked intimately to aluminium smelting). Yet the state tightly controlled the sources and 
distribution of growth – including finance – ďeĐause the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛s stƌuĐtuƌe ŵade it ǀulŶeƌaďle to 
inflation as well as boom and bust. 
 
The Icelandic economy rests on a very narrow base. Manufacturing firms can rarely attain the requisite 
economies of scale to be competitive in global markets. Instead scale insensitive or naturally sheltered 
sectors predominate. Services exports are possible, as with DeCODE Genetics͛ (Íslensk erfðagreining) 
production of R&D for the pharmaceutical industry; tourist ƌeĐeipts ŵostlǇ offset IĐelaŶdeƌs͛ oǁŶ tƌaǀel. 
Exports of fish and related animal products typically accounted foƌ half of IĐelaŶd͛s goods exports; 
exports of energy in the form of raw aluminium accounted for a further quarter but will soon displace 
fish (OECD, 2008:29). IĐelaŶd͛s aďilitǇ to iŵpoƌt ƌests oŶ these tǁo seĐtoƌs, Ǉet ďoth aƌe iŶheƌeŶtlǇ 
inelastic in a recession or currency crisis. Imported raw materials (bauxite) account for one quarter of 
the value of aluminium exports, limiting the utility of currency devaluation. Aluminium exports are not 
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easily scaled, as increased production requires large, lumpy and time consuming investments in both 
energy output and smelting facilities. While fish exports are easily scalable in response to changes in 
demand, long term sustainability limits the size of the catch. By contrast, in larger, more diversified 
economies, recessions and currency crises shift demand away from imports toward more readily 
available domestic substitutes and more sectors can generate exports. 
 
Fishing and smelting employ only about one tenth of the work force, all manufacturing a further tenth, 
and all three are shrinking in proportion to the whole population. If Icelanders were willing and able to 
emigrate en masse, or willing to accept an increasingly unequal income distribution, this might not 
matter. Like any quarry economy, Iceland would export its excess, unemployable population. How then 
is export income and income gains redistributed in a way that produces a relatively flat income 
distribution as well as full employment? Iceland͛s state essentially transforms receipts from the two 
main exports into a livelihood for all Icelanders through a comprehensive set of transfers run through 
the collective bargaining system and welfare state.  
 
Collective bargaining sets a floor on wages in all sectors, redistributing income from export sectors to 
the non-traded sectors, including the welfare state. Labour law imposes any minimums negotiated by a 
giǀeŶ uŶioŶ oƌ fedeƌatioŶ oŶ ǁoƌkeƌs doiŶg siŵilaƌ ǁoƌk iŶ that seĐtoƌ ;i.e. ĐoŶĐateŶatioŶͿ. IĐelaŶd͛s 
labour force is highly organized, with 80 percent coverage (Dølvik, 2007). The Icelandic Confederation of 
Labour, ASÍ, accounts for most of this, with the Federation of General and Special Workers 
(Starfsgreinasamband Íslands – SGS) accounting foƌ half of ASÍ͛s Đoǀeƌage ;ASÍ, ϮϬϬϵͿ. Feŵale laďouƌ 
force participation is above the already high Nordic norm, at roughly 80 percent and is concentrated in 
the public sector. The Federation of State and Municipal Workers, BSRB, covers roughly 12 percent of 
the work force. With SGS accounting for one-third of the entire organized labour force, and the 
eŵploǇeƌ͛s fedeƌation Samtök Atvinnulfísins covering half of all employees, wage minimums were easily 
transmitted across the entire economy even after the end of automatic wage indexation in the 1980s 
(Mjøset and Sigurjonsson, nd).  
 
The welfare state also redistributes income. The high level of female employment stabilizes income in 
dual-earner households and assures an income for single earner households. The tax system transfers 
considerable income downwards, providing 12 percent of income in the third decile, rising to 25 percent 
of income in the first decile. Much of this transfer occurred through generous tax allowances on home 
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mortgages – the state essentially absorbed the cost of the first USD3000 in mortgage interest for 
households with below average incomes (OECD, 2001:62-4). Strict controls over finance were also part 
of this welfare state. A segmented financial system assured most households access to housing finance 
(including tax subsidies) while reserving significant capital for the state to use to build out aluminium 
related infrastructure. 
 
As elseǁheƌe, housiŶg fiŶaŶĐe ƌepƌeseŶted aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt paƌt of IĐelaŶd͛s Đƌedit ŵaƌket. The ϴϬ plus 
percent rate of individual homeownership in Iceland magnifies this importance. The Icelandic state had 
regulated the flow of credit to the housing market through the Housing Financing Fund (HFF - 
Íbúðalánasjóður) and its predecessors. The HFF was the primary supplier of mortgage credit in Iceland 
through 2004. Housing investment was relatively small, at 3.5 percent of GDP, but HFF bonds provided 
the ŵajoƌ asset oŶ the ďooks of IĐelaŶd͛s pƌiǀate peŶsioŶ fuŶds eǀeŶ afteƌ those fuŶds ǁeƌe peƌŵitted 
to invest overseas in 2000 (OECD, 2001:108-9). Pre-deregulation, the HFF and its predecessors provided 
a steady if limited flow of credit through simple, vanilla mortgages. Interest rates tended to be below 
market rates, but loan to value ratios were capped at 65 to 70 percent. HFF interest rates stepped down 
in the 1990s as global disinflation drove down nominal interest rates everywhere, moved up a bit after 
2000 and then fell from 2004 onward (OECD, 2008:74). 
 
3:  Icelandic leverage in global markets:  a house of cards made from houses 
 
All this began changing in the late 1990s (see Skaar Viken, this issue for more details). Privatization and 
liberalization of credit markets allowed households to go on a spending spree, and financial firms on an 
acquisition spree. Mortgage markets linked the two, as in America. On the supply side, deregulation 
freed private banks to import foreign capital. In reforms typical of the 1990s, though later than in 
Scandinavia, the state transformed a variety of financial and production agencies either into private 
sector entities or publicly owned but commercially oriented firms (Schwartz, 1994). By 2002 the state 
divested its holdings in a variety of banks, including Landsbanki and Búnaðarbanki. Privatization enabled 
Investment banks like Kaupthing to merge with Búnaðarbanki to gain access to consumer deposits and 
enter commercial banking markets (OECD, 2003:92). This forced the existing private bank Íslandsbanki 
;GlitŶiƌ BaŶki͛s pƌedeĐessoƌͿ out of its tƌaditioŶal lethaƌgǇ. BǇ ϮϬϬϲ, the thƌee ďig ďaŶks ĐoŶtƌolled ϴϱ 
percent of assets and deposits (OECD, 2009:9). 
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On the demand side, the state tightly controlled credit to households until the late 1990s. The pre-
deregulation controls on mortgage finance meant that Icelandic houses were probably undervalued. 
Additionally, the 70 percent loan cap on first time home-buyers forcing considerable saving. 
Deregulation and privatization dramatically expanded the supply of capital, allowing housing prices to 
rise rapidly. Credit expanded 20 percent in 2004 and 30 percent in 2005 (OECD, 2006:62, 65). Like 
Americans, Icelanders used their housing finance system to fund increased consumption. Icelanders 
rushed to take advantage of falling interest rates when refinancing of mortgages became possible in 
2004. Newly available foreign currency loans magnified the interest rate drop, and predictably helped 
set of a housing price bubble (Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2008). By 2008, 20 percent of household debt was 
denominated in foreign currency (OECD, 2009:13).   
 
Just as in the United States, households used refinancing to extract and consume equity from their 
houses (see Dalby Trætteberg this issue). Equity extraction helped drive household debt levels from 160 
percent of disposable income in 1999 to 220 percent in 2004 (OECD, 2006:33, 76). Households͛ 
consumption grew twice as fast as income 2003 to 2005 causing IĐelaŶd͛s alƌeadǇ laƌge ĐuƌƌeŶt aĐĐouŶt 
deficit to explode to 16.5 percent of GDP (OECD, 2008:23). Imported capital goods for new smelters 
accounted for one-third of this, and excess consumption the rest (OECD, 2006:24-5). Nothing limited 
imported consumption as long as someone was willing to extend mortgage credit. AŶd IĐelaŶd͛s ŶeǁlǇ 
deregulated financial sector was happy to extend credit. 
 
IĐelaŶd͛s ďaŶks eǆteŶded Đƌedit ďeĐause theǇ thought theǇ ǁeƌe leŶdiŶg agaiŶst seĐuƌe Đollateƌal. As in 
the United States, falling interest rates caused house prices and thus collateral to rise. Banks loaned 
households more money, which promptly round-tripped to the housing market, driving home prices up 
even more in a temporarily self-validating cycle. Overall house prices rose 89 percent from early 2001 to 
late 2007, including an eye-popping 60 percent from 2003 to 2005, while Reykjavik area prices more 
than doubled, 1999 to 2005 (OECD, 2006:75; OECD, 2009:25). Half of the increase in household wealth 
came from housing, 2003 to 2007 (OECD, 2009:30).  
 
The other half came from financial assets – mostly shares of the financial sector itself. Domestic 
expansion rested on fictitious capital – the unrealized and unrealizable equity gains on Icelandic 
property. So did the overseas expansion of IĐelaŶd͛s ƌelatiǀelǇ tiŶǇ ďaŶks. Offshore borrowing floated 
them iŶto tǁo diffeƌeŶt ŵaƌkets. Fiƌst, IĐelaŶd͛s ďaŶks ĐoŶstƌuĐted a pƌofitaďle ĐaƌƌǇ tƌade ďoƌƌoǁiŶg 
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short term, low interest rate funds in offshore markets and reinvesting those funds long term in higher 
interest rate mortgages onshore, acquisitions offshore. Landsbanki͛s Icesave accounts aŶd KaupthiŶg͛s 
Edge accounts attracted over £500 million in deposits. Burgeoning balance sheets enticed European 
banks and investors to take over $50 billion in equity stakes in Icelandic banks (Lewis, 2009). These 
investor inflows tripled IĐelaŶd͛s shaƌe ŵaƌket capitalization from the beginning of 2005 to mid-2007 (in 
October 2008 it would lose 94 percent of its capitalization) (Bloomberg). As with housing prices, soaring 
equity prices were temporarily self validating – and as Skaar Viken (this issue) notes, self-serving – as 
rising prices attracted more inflows that in turn validated the earlier increase in prices.  
 
Second, bigger balance sheets and rising share prices allowed Icelandic financial firms to indulge in a 
second leveraged mismatch, using their own shares and borrowed money to accumulate an expensive 
collection of financial firms in Europe. Even non-financial retail firms like Baugur leveraged their existing 
shares into acquisitions in Britain and Ireland. So both at the firm and sector level, Icelandic financial 
firms transformed increased short term borrowing into long term and illiquid investments. Domestic and 
offshore developments ran in parallel, with increases in domestic fictitious capital permitting increases 
in borrowing and lending power on and offshore. By 2007, the big three banks͛ total assets were roughly 
10 times IĐelaŶd͛s GDP, ǁell aďove the OECD average (OECD, 2009:10).  
 
This virtuous cycle was not a perpetual motion machine. As in the United States, this temporarily 
virtuous cycle relied on continuously increasing housing prices, continuous disinflation, and continuous 
inflows of foreign capital. Each of these tailwinds eventually gave out. By 2006 housing prices had 
peaked, the inflation rate had jumped by 50 percent, and rising mortgage defaults made all investors on 
the short end of the maturity mismatch increasingly skittish. As those investors stopped funding 
AŵeƌiĐaŶ fiŶaŶĐial fiƌŵs͛ leǀeƌaged ŵatuƌitǇ ŵisŵatĐhes, the ǁhole house of Đaƌds Đaŵe tuŵďliŶg 
down. 
 
So did IĐelaŶd͛s house of Đaƌds. Coŵpaƌed to the UŶited States, IĐelaŶd͛s fiŶaŶĐial sǇsteŵ had eǀeŶ 
higher levels of leverage, housing prices had climbed even higher, and financial firms had gambled at 
even more extreme odds. By 2007, Landsbanki, Glitnir/Íslandsbanki and Kaupthing collectively had 
accumulated short term foƌeigŶ deďts eƋual to ƌoughlǇ fiǀe tiŵes IĐelaŶd͛s GDP, and were responsible 
foƌ iŶĐƌeasiŶg IĐelaŶd͛s Ŷet eǆteƌŶal deďt ďǇ ϭϰϮ peƌĐeŶt of GDP ;OECD, ϮϬϬϵ:ϭϬͿ. By contrast, all US 
foreign debt by all actors amounted to only a bit more than US GDP, while net foreign debt was only 25 
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percent of US GDP. And Iceland did not possess the international reserve currency, so the relative cost 
of its crisis was much bigger. The IĐelaŶdiĐ CeŶtƌal BaŶk͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt guess – based on an optimistic level of 
post-crisis asset prices – puts the cost of bailing out the three banks at 17 percent of GDP in 2009 (OECD, 
2009:47). And this does not include making domestic depositors whole.  
 
4: Too small to save versus too big to fail 
 
When financial crisis erupted in the summer of 2007, the US central bank and Treasury were able to 
manufacture money to partially ƌestoƌe ďaŶks͛ Đapital ďase and allow them to meet their short term 
obligations. The US central bank allowed US banks to exchange their bad investments in long term 
mortgage backed securities for cash and Treasury notes; it provided dollars to European banks so they 
Đould settle theiƌ tƌades. IĐelaŶd͛s ĐeŶtƌal ďaŶk could not resolǀe its ďaŶks͛ ŵatuƌitǇ ŵisŵatĐh ďǇ 
printing money. Instead, the Icelandic state had to overtly nationalize and restructure all three banks in 
October 2008, takiŶg oŶ foƌeigŶ deďts aŵouŶtiŶg to thƌee tiŵes IĐelaŶd͛s GDP. As its banks crashed, so 
too did IcelaŶd͛s stoĐkŵaƌket, housiŶg pƌiĐes, aŶd ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ, destroying the asset base that theoretically 
had offset the ďaŶks͛ liaďilities to depositoƌs aŶd gloďal ŵoŶeǇ ŵaƌkets. Moreover, many households 
and firms with foreign-currency denominated debt lacked compensating foreign currency earnings and 
so had to devote more of their devalued Kroner to debt service (OECD, 2009:13). 
 
IĐelaŶd͛s ďooŵ aŶd ďust thus replicated and exaggerated the causes, development and trajectory of the 
AŵeƌiĐaŶ ďooŵ aŶd ďust. IĐelaŶd͛s sŵall size ŵagŶifies the appaƌeŶt iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of iŶdiǀidual aĐtoƌs 
and firms. But the same combination of excessive leverage and mismatched maturities that humbled US 
and European financial firms Đaused IĐelaŶd͛s Đƌisis too. IĐelaŶd͛s ŶeǁlǇ liďeƌalized fiŶaŶĐial seĐtoƌ used 
cheap foreign money to enable Icelandic homeowners to consume their home equity based on 
unsustainable home prices. Rising home prices also provided those Icelandic firms with the asset base 
they needed to pursue self-serving overseas acquisitions of long term positions in financial firms, real 
estate, and retail. 
 
There are differences though. Iceland came late to the global party, drank too quickly, and hit the floor 
rather harder than larger economies. Financial deregulation lagged that in the United States by as much 
as a decade. The increase in home prices was larger and faster than in the United States. And unlike the 
UŶited States, IĐelaŶd͛s fiŶaŶĐial ďoom did not create any new productive capacity that might help 
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amortize the debts its financial firms created. The new smelters constructed in the 2000s would have 
ďeeŶ ďuilt aŶǇǁaǇ. IĐelaŶd͛s Đase illustƌates ǁell ThuĐǇdides͛ assessment, as Thorhallsson (this issue) 
shows: the strong do what they can while the weak do what they must. The United States could rely on 
the dollaƌ͛s positioŶ as a ƌeseƌǀe ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ to giǀe ŵisďehaǀiŶg fiŶaŶĐial fiƌŵs a soft plaĐe to laŶd ǁheŶ 
their party ended. Too soft perhaps. IĐelaŶd͛s fiŶaŶĐial VikiŶgs paƌtied theiƌ loŶgďoats oŶto ǀeƌǇ haƌd 
reefs, handing their passengers the lead of massive new public debts rather than life vests. Unlike the 
United States, Iceland could not just print more money or borrow more abroad to keep its banks alive, 
while blithely depreciating it currency. Instead Iceland found itself forced by Britain and the Netherlands 
to guarantee off-shore deposits at the same time it faced massive increases in domestic unemployment 
and the fiscal deficit. Small states must behave more prudently than large ones, not because it is the 
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